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CONSTITUTIONAL
CLAUSE-SECULAR

LAW-FREEDOM

OF

RELIGION-

ESTABLISHMENT

PURPOSE-The United States Supreme Court

has held that the articulated purpose in a state statute allowing for

the teaching of creation science in public schools was a "sham" and
therefore violated the judicially created secular purpose requirement of the establishment clause.
Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S.Ct. 2573 (1987).
During 1981, Louisiana enacted a measure sponsored by State

Senator Bill Keith entitled the "Balanced Treatment for CreationScience and Evolution-Science Act" (Act).' The Act provided, inter alia, that elementary and secondary schools were to provide
"balanced treatment" to creation-science if evolution-science was
taught.2 Subsequent to the signing of the Act into law, the plain1. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2581-82; id. at 2586-87 (Powell, J., concurring); see generally, McLean v. Arkansas, 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (providing
background on the model for the Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and EvolutionScience Act). The "Act" was based on a model act that had been circulated among various
individuals around the country. Sometime around 1977, Paul Ellwanger, a respiratory therapist with no apparent legal education, began preparing the model act for introduction in
various legislatures to support the teaching of creationism in public schools. Mr. Ellwanger
corresponded with Louisiana State Senator Bill Keith for the purpose of discussing a lobby-,
ing strategy. In his correspondence, Mr. Ellwanger wrote to Senator Keith: "I view this
whole battle as one between God and anti-God forces, though I know there are a large number of evolutionists who believe in God." Id.
2. 107 S. Ct at 2576; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.1-6. "Balanced treatment" is a defined term in the Act. The pertinent text of the Act is as follows:
SUBPART D-2. BALANCED TREATMENT FOR CREATION- SCIENCE AND
EVOLUTION-SCIENCE IN PUBLIC SCHOOL INSTRUCTION
§286.1 SHORT TITLE
This Subpart shall be known as the "Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and
Evolution-Science Act.

§286.2

PURPOSE

This Subpart is enacted for the purpose of protecting academic freedom.
§286.3 DEFINITIONS
As used in this Subpart, unless otherwise clearly indicated, these terms have the
following meanings:
(1) "Balanced treatment" means providing whatever information and instruction in
both creation and evolution models the classroom teacher determines is necessary
and appropriate to provide insight into both theories in view of the textbooks and
other instructional materials available for use in his classroom.
(2) "Creation-science" means the scientific evidences for creation and inferences from
those scientific evidences.
(3) "Evolution-science" means the scientific evidences for evolution and inferences
from those scientific evidences.
(4) "Public schools" means public secondary and elementary schools.
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tiffs' instituted an action in the Federal District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana against the State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education (BESE) 4 to enjoin the Act from going into effect and to declare it violative of the United States Constitution's establishment clause.' Shortly after the commencement
of the suit, the state's BESE left the defense and realigned itself to
become a plaintiff in the action and moved for summary
judgment.'
BESE contended that the Act removed its authority over educational policy by allowing the legislature to set subject matter curriculum. Thus, it was argued that the Act violated provisions of the
§

286.4

AUTHORIZATION

FOR

BALANCED

TREATMENT;

REQUIREMENT

FOR

NONDISCRIMINATION.

A. Commencing with the 1982-1983 school year, public schools within this state shall
give balanced treatment to creation-science and to evolution-science. Balanced treatment of these two models shall be given in classroom lectures taken as a whole for
each course, in textbook materials taken as a whole for each course, in library materials taken as a whole for the sciences and taken as a whole for the humanities, and in
other educational programs in public schools, to the extent that such lectures, textbooks, library materials, or educational programs deal in any way with the subject of
the origin of man, life, the earth, or the universe. When creation or evolution is
taught, each shall be taught as a theory, rather than as proven scientific fact.
B. Public schools within this state and their personnel shall not discriminate by reducing a grade of a student or by singling out and publicly criticizing any student
who demonstrates a satisfactory understanding of both evolution-science or creationscience and who accepts or rejects either model in whole or part.
C. No teacher in public elementary or secondary school or instructor in any statesupported university in Louisiana, who chooses to be a creation-scientist or to teach
scientific data which points to creationism shall, for that reason, be discriminated
against in any way by any school board, college board, or administrator.
Id.
3. Plaintiffs consisted of Louisiana clerics, educators and parents of school children.
107 S. Ct. at 2576.
4. Other defendants in the suit included: the Governor of Louisiana, David C. Treen;
Louisiana Attorney General William J. Guste, Jr.; State Superintendent of Education, J.
Kelly Nix; the Louisiana Department of Education; the St. Tammany Parish School Board;
the Orleans Parish School Board, which later became realigned as a party plaintiff. See
Aguillard v. Treen, 440 So.2d 704 (La. 1983).
5. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I, cl. 1, provides that: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof-, . . ." Id. The first
amendment was applied to the states in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, (1940); Stone
v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41, n. 2 (1980); School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 394 U.S. 203
(1963).
Senator Keith and other interested parties brought a separate action to declare the Act
constitutional. They also sought to have the Act enforced by injunctive means. The district
court dismissed that action due to a lack of jurisdiction. Keith v. Louisiana Dept. of Educ.,
553 F. Supp. 295 (M.D. La. 1982). See also Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir.
1985) (briefly discussing the related suit while reviewing the history of the action).
6. See Aguillard v. Treen, 440 So.2d 704 (La. 1983).
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Louisiana constitution vesting that authority in the BESE' The
district court, in an unpublished opinion, held that the power over
educational policy conferred on the BESE by the constitution was
exclusive and that the Act constituted school policy making by the
legislature.' The court of appeals for the fifth circuit certified the
question to the Louisiana Supreme Court,9 which held that the Act
did not violate the Louisiana state constitution. 10
Following the answer to the certified question, the court of appeals reversed the decision of the district court and remanded the
case with instructions to consider the federal constitutional issue."
The district court found that the purpose of the Act, as expressed
in its plain meaning, was the promotion of a religion, and granted
the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. 12 The court of appeals affirmed the decision,' 8 calling the case a "simple one" because the Act's stated purpose-to provide for the teaching of creation science-was furthering a particular religious belief.' " In an 8
to 7 decision, a petition for a rehearing en banc was denied.'8 The
7. LA.CONST. ART. VIII., § 3(A) provides that the BESE "shall supervise and control
the public elementary and secondary schools, vocational-technical training and special
schools under its jurisdiction and shall have budgetary responsibility for all funds appropriated or allocated by the state for those schools, all as provided by law." Id.
8. See Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251, 1254, n. 5 (5th Cir. 1985).
9. Aguillard v. Treen, 430 So.2d 660 (La. 1983).
10. The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected, inter alia, the argument that § 3(a) of the
Louisiana constitution, see supra note 7, vests exclusive authority over educational policy in
the BESE, by examining the plain meaning of the language of the state constitution. Aguillard v. Treen, 440 So.2d 704, 709 (La. 1983). The court also rejected BESE's argument that
§ 13(a), which provides for the Legislature to appropriate funds to the BESE for the
purchase of books, allows it to set what policies will be implemented. The court held that
those policies were subject to the supervision of the Legislature under laws it might pass. Id.
at 710.
11. Aguillard v. Treen, 720 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1983).
12. The court held that: "Because it promotes the beliefs of some theistic sects to the
detriment of others, the statute violates the fundamental First Amendment principle that a
state must be neutral in its treatment of religions." Aguillard v. Treen, 634 F. Supp. 426,
429 (E.D. La. 1985).
13. Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1985). Governor Edwards replaced
former Governor Treen as a named party in the suit at this point in the proceedings. Id.
14. Id. at 1253. The court of appeals also relied on many of the authorities later used
by the Supreme Court's majority in affirming. Wallace v. Jaifree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Stone
v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1972).
15. 778 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1985). Gee, J., joined by five other judges and the Chief
Judge, dissented to the denial of rehearing en banc arguing that under a summary judgment
motion the affidavits supporting the view that creationism is a valid scientific theory must
be accepted as true because there are at least two views on the subject, and that created a
genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 226. The dissent then continued to argue that the
authorities relied upon by the majority, including Lemon v. Kurtzman, see infra note 16,
and Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980), were ones in which a "direct and clear religious
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Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. 16
The Supreme Court's opinion began by reaffirming the three
part test compiled in Lemon v. Kurtzman7 for determining
whether legislation violates the establishment clause. The Court
found that the first part of the test, requiring the legislature to
have a secular purpose in the legislation it advances, conflicted
with the Act's actual purpose of promoting a religious viewpoint.1 8
The Court drew the conclusion that the plain meaning of the Act
lacked a secular purpose, in spite of its explicit proclamation to the
contrary.' 9
The Court next considered the legislative history of the Act, focusing on the purpose and motives of its sponsor, Senator Keith.2 0
The Court's analysis relied substantially on the expressions of the
Act's supporters in the Legislature, including those other than
Senator Keith, and its evolution in the legislative process.2 The
Court concluded that the Act had a religious purpose and that its
asserted goal of "promoting academic freedom" would not be met
by including creation science in a public school curriculum. 2 2 Ficonnection" were present. Id. at 227. Finally, the majority was criticized for finding, based
upon its "visceral knowledge," that the legislature's motives were religious. Id.
16. 476 U.S. 1103 (1986).
17. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Lemon, and two companion cases, Earley v. DiCenso and
Robinson v. DiCenso, concerned state statutes that provided aid to religiously sponsored
elementary and secondary schools. The Court, speaking through Chief Justice Burger,
struck down the statutes as constituting "excessive entanglement" due to the "cumulative
impact of the entire relationship .. " Id. at 614. The Court accepted the secular justifications for the statutes. Id. at 614. During the course of its analysis, the Court identified the
three part test that has become its primary tool in establishment clause cases. Id. at 612-13.
See infra note 64.
The Edwards Court explained the Lemon test as follows: "First, the legislature must have
adopted the law with a secular purpose. Second, the statute's principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion. Third, the statute must not result
in an excessive entanglement of government with religion." 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2577 (1987).
A statute violating any of the three parts will fail under the establishment clause prohibition of separation of church and state. Id.
18. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2581 (1987).
19. The Act's stated purpose is "protecting academic freedom". LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
17:286.2 (West 1982). See supra note 2. In considering this aspect, the Court remarked:
"While the Court is normally deferential to a State's articulation of a secular purpose, it is
required that a statement of such purpose be sincere and not a sham." 107 S. Ct. at 2579.
20. 107 S. Ct. at 2579-2583.
21. Id. at 2581-82, n. 13-14, in which the Court quotes Senator Keith and other members of the Louisiana legislature asserting their religious beliefs.
22. The Court found that the Act did nothing to add to what was already provided for
in existing state law. That is, "[t]he Act does not grant teachers a flexibility that they did
not already possess to supplant the present science curriculum with the presentation of theories, besides evolution, about the origin of life." 107 S. Ct. at 2579.
The Court compared this to Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), which concerned an
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nally, the Court concluded that the granting of summary judgment
by the district court was entirely proper.23
Justice Powell, joined by Justice O'Connor, concurred in the
opinion, 4 but emphasized, apparently over concern with subjects
that might parallel religious teachings, that there remained "broad
discretion" in state and local school boards to select the subjects
and courses of study.2" Justice White wrote that he would affirm
the court of appeals and the district court based on the principle of
deferring to reasonable constructions of state statutes by lower
courts.26 Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
27
dissented.
The dissenters began by criticizing the Court's reliance on the
plain meaning of the statute.2 8 In the dissent's view, the term "creation science" is a term of art which, under Louisiana law, is given
its "meaning and acceptance with the learned in the art, trade or
profession
. 29 The dissent stressed that, in its view, the benefit of the doubt must be given to the appellants on the meaning of
the term "creation science"2 °
Justice Scalia's opinion next turned to a criticism and analysis of
the secular purpose prong of the three-part Lemon test.31 Noting
that the purpose prong is seldom used by the Court to invalidate a
statute under the establishment clause, the dissent found that the
Alabama statute allowing for a period of silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer ... "
ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984). There remained unchallenged in Wallace another statute that provided for meditation, but not prayer, at the start of the school day. ALA. CODE §
16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984). The Court found that the challenged statute did nothing to add to
what was already provided for by the statute in place. 472 U.S. 38, 58-59.
23. The defendants had contended that the summary judgment motion should be reversed because the affidavits of their witnesses raised genuine issues of material fact on the
question as to whether creation science is a religion. This point was used by the dissent to
the denial of rehearing en banc before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. See supra note
14. The Court rejected this argument, relying on the district court's rationale that none of
the experts filing the affidavits had participated in the legislative proceedings, and they
were, therefore, not qualified to explain the "contemporaneous purpose" of the statute when
it was passed. 107 S. Ct. at 2584.

24. Id. at 2584. Justice Powell concurred in all of the Court's opinion and Justice
O'Connor joined the opinion in all but Part II. Id. Justice White concurred in the judgment.
Id. at 2590.
25. Id. at 2584.
26. Id. at 2590-91.
27. Id. at 2591.
28. Id. at 2592.
29.

Id. at 2592, citing LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 15 (West 1952).

30. 107 S. Ct. at 2592. This reasoning paralleled the reasoning of the court of appeal's
dissent in the denial for a petition for rehearing en banc. See supra note 14.
31. 107 S. Ct. at 2593.
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requirement that must be shown under the prupose prong is one of
" 'actual' [religious] motives of those responsible for the challenged
action." s2 Justice Scalia failed to find that the legislature had no
33
secular purpose in enacting the Act.
Finally, the dissent focused on a specific criticism of the purpose
prong of the Lemon test.-4 Justice Scalia expressed his support for
an earlier critique of Lemon written by Justice Rehnquist in Wallace v. Jaffree.3 5 The dissent also found the subjective intent of
legislatures to be a dangerous area for the Court to venture into,
and one that is justified only if it was required by the establishment clause.3 6 Justice Scalia concluded that the establishment
3
clause did not require that sort of evaluation .
The dissent's reliance on a case criticizing the historical basis for
the Lemon test, its harsh criticism of Lemon's secular purpose
component, and its general criticism of a purpose analysis altogether, raises legitimate questions concerning the purpose prong's
foundation in case law,3 8 its future use,3" and the use of a legislative purpose analysis in areas outside of the establishment clause.4 0
Moreover, although the dissent attempted to distinguish the secular purpose inquiry under Lemon from other legislative purpose"'
or motive inquiries, it also recognized that the problems are often
32. Id. at 2593.
33. Id. at 2594, 2596-2605.
34. Id. at 2605. See supra note 17.
35. 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)(state statute providing for a one
minute period of meditation was not based on a secular purpose). Justice Rehnquist
presented an extensive evaluation of the historical background surrounding the establishment clause and the free exercise clause of the first amendment. Id. See also Note, Wallace
v. Jaffree and the Need to Reform Establishment Clause Analysis, 35 CATH. UL. REV. 573
(1986) ("[In exceptional cases the Court has opted to return to the historical approach of
earlier decisions.") Id. at 581-82.
36. 107 S. Ct. at 2607.
37. Id.
38. See Wallace supra note 35 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
39. For a criticism of the Lemon test's continued use, see, e.g., Note, Developments in
the Law-Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1606, 1646 (1986)("Application of the
Lemon test thus depends entirely on the characterization of the government's actions; when
characterized in accordance with the 'secular' ends encompassed by the accommodation rationale, government actions may pass muster under Lemon's purpose-effect test."); see also
Choper infra note 71.
40. See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
41. 107 S. Ct. at 2593 (Scalia, J., dissenting). "[Riegardless of what 'legislative purpose' may mean in other contexts, for the purpose of the Lemon test it means the 'actual'
motives of those responsible for the challenged action." Id.
42. "By and large the term 'purpose' has served as nothing more useful than a signal
that the Court is willing to look at motivation, 'motive' as a signal that it is not." Ely,
Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1217
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the same." The motive analysis that have taken place in the establishment of religion context have often exhibited the general uneasiness of the Court in developing and relying on legislative purpose for evaluating constitutional compliance."
Everson v. Board of Education4 6 is often credited by the Court
as having been the case that formed the basis for the secular purpose test.4 6 Writing for the Court in Everson, Justice Black identified the test's standard rather ambiguously as legislation being
drawn with a private purpose as opposed to a public one.4 7 He then
characterized the statute in Everson as "public welfare" legislation
because it aided all those who needed help, comparing it to police
and fire protection.48 The statute in Everson was upheld because it
served this general "public purpose. '49
Perhaps even more than a purpose analysis, however, the Everson Court was also using an effects analysis of the state's action.50
Over time, this would lead to problems in using the purpose analysis because, while Justice Black relied on the effects of the statute
in conjunction with its "public purpose,""1 the result was the lack
of a well-developed evaluative procedure for determining when a
legislative purpose would run afoul of the establishment clause. In
subsequent decisions, the Court would rely on Everson as the purpose analysis' foundation, without ever seriously questioning or developing it as a meaningful tool for evaluating legislative purpose.
(1970). See also Eisenberg, infra note 75; Note, Legislative Purpose and ConstitutionalAdjudication, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1887, 1887-88, n.1 (1970). "[I]t probably is . . . fruitless to
attempt a principled articulation of the distinction between motive and purpose." Id.
(quoted in, Ely at 1221).
43. 107 S. Ct. at 2605 (Scalia, J., dissenting). "[D]iscerning the subjective motivation
of those enacting the statute is, to be honest, almost always an impossible task." Id.
44. See generally note 75, infra, and the authorities cited therein.
45. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Everson concerned the reimbursement by a local school board of
money expended by parents for bus transportation in sending their children to parochial
schools. Id.
46. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 443 (1961); Abington School Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968).
47. 330 U.S. at 16-17.
48. Id. at 17.
49. Id. at 17.
50. Id. at 18. The Court considered the statute "as applied" in concluding that it had
a general purpose. Id.
51. Id. at 17-18.
52. See supra note 41. The Court often combined the secular purpose and effects analysis as one test for a violation of the establishment clause. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236 (1968). "Appellants have shown us nothing about the necessary effects of the
statute that is contrary to its stated purpose." Id. at 243; Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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Another aspect of the secular purpose requirement that has been
present since its inception in Everson, and which has also been
combined with an effects analysis thus confusing the secular purpose test, is the willingness of the Court to infer a non-secular purpose. In Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,5 the Court was
presented with arguments by counsel for the state asserting that
the reading of the Bible or Lord's Prayer in public school served to
promote general moral values.5 5 The Court was therefore faced
with an assertion of a secular purpose that could seemingly withstand purpose analysis scrutiny. The Court concluded, however,
that the "religious character of the exercise was admitted by the
State" and that "even if the purpose is not strictly religious, it is
sought to be accomplished through readings. . . from the Bible. '5
The Court established that, under certain conditions, it would infer a religious purpose through the use or effect of incorporating
articles associated with religious dogma into a public school
setting.
The Court finally enshrined the loosely developed purpose prong
as a separate but equal component of a three part test in Lemon,
where it credited the purpose prong as having been part of the
"cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years. ' 57 In
fact, however, the Court had only once before used the secular purpose test to strike down a state statute" and, as was the case in
Edwards, the statute centered on the teaching of evolution." The
Court did not expand on the secular purpose requirement,"0 other
53. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
54. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). Under challenge in Schempp was a Pennsylvania statute that
provided for a daily recitation from the Bible. A companion case, Murray v. Curlett, 374
U.S. 203 (1963), concerned a Maryland school board rule that provided for the opening of
classes with a reading from the Bible or the Lord's Prayer.
55. 374 U.S. at 223-24.
56. Id. at 224.
57. 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). For a summary of Lemon and its three part test, see
supra note 17.
58. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). Justice Scalia uses this in his dissent in
Edwards to point out how little the secular purpose part of the Lemon test has been developed. 107 S. Ct. at 2593 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Although the secular purpose prong of the
Lemon test has not been well-developed by itself, it has been more often used and applied
in conjunction with the effects analysis. See infra notes 61, 62 and 70.
59. "The Arkansas law was an adaptation of the famous Tennessee 'monkey
law'...." 393 U.S. at 98. The statute on which the Arkansas law was based was the subject
of the Scopes trial of 1927 and prohibited the teaching of the theory of evolution. See Epperson, 393 U.S. at 98; Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927).
60. Instead of clarifying the secular purpose analysis, the Court relied on the views
expressed in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). "[W]hat are the pur-
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than to continue the pattern that would surface again in later
cases, including Edwards, of inferring a purpose of promoting reli-

gion.61 Justice Black, who had written the opinion in Everson and

thereby gained credit as the author of the secular purpose requirement, questioned in a concurring opinion in Everson the use of a
motive inquiry at all.62
Following Lemon, the Court insists that it has applied the three
part test, including the purpose prong analysis as a separate component, 3 in all but one or two cases." Regardless of the number of

times the three part test has been applied, the Court had used the
purpose analysis under it to strike down legislation in only two
cases prior to Edwards."'In Wallace v. Jaffree, 6 the Court used a
motive analysis to hold unconstitutional an amended statute that
provided for a one minute period of silent meditation or prayer
pose and primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of
religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the
Constitution." 374 U.S. at 222, quoted in Epperson, 393 U.S. at 107.
As there were two statutes under review in Schempp, and only one of the district courts
had made a finding that there was no secular purpose, the Court did not find one to have
been enacted without a secular purpose, and instead it relied on an effects analysis to strike
down both. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223-24.
61. 393 U.S. at 107. "In the present case, there can be no doubt that Arkansas has
sought to prevent its teachers from discussing the theory of evolution because it is contrary
to the belief of some that the Book of Genesis must be the exclusive source of doctrine as to
the origin of man." Id.
62. Id. at 109 (Black, J., concurring). "[T]his Court has consistently held that it is not
for us to invalidate a statute because of our views that the 'motives' behind its passage were
improper; it is simply too difficult to determine what those motives were. See, e.g., United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382-383 (1968)." Id. at 113.
63. See Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2577.
64. The exact number of times that the Court has refused to apply the Lemon test is
the subject of some contradiction among the various opinions. See, e.g., Edwards, 107 S. Ct.
at 2577, n.4, where the Court acknowledges that it has not applied the Lemon test in Marsh
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), but states that that case is the only time it has deviated
from it. Marsh concerned the opening prayer delivered in a state legislature before the start
of a legislative session. The prayer was challenged on establishment clause grounds and the
Court upheld the practice based on its "historical acceptance ...." Id. In Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), the dissent cites Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668 (1984), as a case along with Marsh in which the Court has refused to apply the
Lemon test. In Lynch, the Court actually did use the Lemon purpose prong as a guide in
determining that a nativity scene in a Christmas display was not violative of the establishment clause. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680-81. To confuse matters even further, the Court in
Lynch contends that it has not applied the Lemon test in Marsh and Larson v. Valente, 456
U.S. 228 (1982). Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679. In Larson, as in Lynch, the Court at least paid lip
service to the Lemon test even if it did not rely on it exclusively.
65. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), supra note 22; Stone v. Graham, 449
U.S. 39 (1980). Justice Scalia relies on this point in his dissent. 107 S.Ct. at 2593 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
66. 472 U.S. 38 (1985). See supra note 22.
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when there already existed another statute that provided only for
meditation. Once again the Court inferred a non-secular legislative
motive, this time by the enactment of an additional statute that
only added the phrase "or voluntary prayer. "67 Similarly, in Stone
v. Graham,68 the Court was left to infer a non-secular purpose in
the posting of the Ten Commandments on schoolroom walls despite an avowed secular educational purpose. 69
If neither Wallace nor Stone developed the secular purpose
analysis, much more than reaffirm that a non-secular purpose
could be inferred from the legislation itself or the history surrounding its enactment, the cases following Lemon that were not
directly decided on the purpose component developed the analysis
even less. In Lynch v. Donnelly,70 the Court did add the requirement that the secular purpose must be such that the statute in
question "was motivated wholly by religious considerations,"7 1 but
67. 472 U.S. at 58-59. "[The] legislature enacted [the statute containing silent meditation or voluntary prayer] despite the existence of [the statute allowing silent meditation
only] for the sole purpose of expressing the State's endorsement of prayer acttvities." Id. at
60.
Justice O'Connor expressed what turned out to be a particularly prophetic remark:
It is of course possible that a legislature will enunciate a sham secular purpose for a
statute. I have little doubt that our courts are capable of distinguishing a sham secular purpose from a sincere one, . . . inquiry into the effect of an enactment would
help decide those close cases where the validity of an expressed secular purpose is in
doubt.
Id. at 75. (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice O'Connor suggested that a
"deferential" position should be taken towards a legislature's articulation of purpose. Id. at
74.
One commentator has suggested that her views constitute a "reformulation" of the Lemon
test, relying in part on her analysis of the relationship between the establishment clause and
the free exercise clause's accommodationist rationale. Id. at 79-84. See Note, supra note 39,
at 1647.
68. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
69. "The pre-eminent purpose for posting the Ten Commandments on schoolroom
walls is plainly religious in nature. The Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in
the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation of a supposed secular purpose
can blind us to that fact." 449 U.S. at 41.
The statute provided that there was to be a small "notation concerning the purpose of the
display, as follows: 'The secular application of the Ten Commandments is clearly seen in its
adoption as the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the Common Law of the
United States.'" Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §158.178 (Baldwin 1980).
70. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
71. Id. at 680. Justice Scalia points this out in his dissent in Edwards: "In all three
cases in which we struck down laws under the Establishment Clause for lack of a secular
purpose, we found that the legislature's sole motive was to promote religion." 107 S. Ct. at
2594 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
This view has received some support from outside the Court as well. See Choper, The
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Prrr.L. Rv. 673,
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then upheld the erection of a creche by the City of Pawtucket, dismissing an apparent non-secular purpose due to "insufficient evidence. ' 72 In Larson v. Valente,"7 the Court expanded on the purpose analysis but ultimately decided on the basis of an
entanglement theory and applied a "strict scrutiny" test. 4
Finally, in Edwards, the Court has reinvigorated the purpose
test as a supposedly distinct component. However, the history of
the Court's use of a purpose analysis indicates that it has been
closely interwoven with the effects analysis. The combination of
the two has allowed the Court to infer a non-secular purpose, but
at the same time caused the purpose analysis to not be fully developed as an independent procedure for determining if the legislature has complied with the establishment clause's restrictions. This
lack of development in a purpose analysis under religious challenges is paralleled by a lack of definition to the Court's evaluation
of motive inquiries in other areas of constitutional jurisprudence.7 5
As a result of this confusion, the Court may have been able to add
clarity to its establishment clause analysis by abandoning, at least
675 (1980). ("Establishment clause should forbid only government action whose purpose is
solely religious . . .")(emphasis in original). Id.
72. 465 U.S. at 680. "[ilt is apparent that, on this record, there is insufficient evidence
to establish that the inclusion of the creche is a purposeful or surreptitious effort to express
some kind of subtle governmental advocacy of a particular religious message." Id.
73. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
74. The Court has identified the "strict scrutiny" test as the appropriate standard of
review in a free exercise case involving racial discrimination. Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). The Court has also applied a "stricter scrutiny" when the third
prong of the Lemon test, excessive entanglement between government and religion, is involved. " A finding of excessive entanglement, typically of the political sort, can serve as a
'warning signal,' triggering stricter judicial review than would otherwise have been appropriate." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 866 (1978), citing, Committee for Pub. Educ.
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). However, Larsen was the first establishment clause case to
expressly use the phrase "strict scrutiny."
75. See Ely, supra note 42, in which he discusses United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367 (1968). In O'Brien, the Court said: "It is a familiar principal of constitutional law that
this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged
illicit legislative motive." 391 U.S. at 383. But see, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253
(1976) ("The requirement of purposeful [racial] discrimination is a common thread running
through the cases.
...
) (Stevens, J., concurring).
See generally Eisenberg, DisproportionateImpact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36 (1977). Eisenberg discusses the use of motive
inquiries in general and concludes that: "When the government seeks to disadvantage individuals because of their race, religion, national origin, or political beliefs, judicial resort to
motive may be the only way to vindicate fundamental constitutional rights." Id. at 149.
Eisenberg also discusses alternatives to resorting to the motive inquiry in the first instance.
The areas in which the Court will use or will not use motive as a device to evaluate the
constitutionality of a state's action is beyond the scope of this note.
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in Edwards, the purpose analysis, and instead, rely exclusively on
7 6
an effects evaluation.
The use of an effects analysis in Edwards would certainly have
been justified given the close association of creationism with religious dogma. 7 7 Under an effects analysis, the Court could easily
find that the Act, if implemented, had as its sine qua non the
teaching of a dogma that is closely associated with a religious belief
that is not shared by others with differing religious beliefs."8 This
type of effects analysis would have spared the Court from having
to call the Louisiana Legislature a liar when it said the Act's pur7' 9
pose was the promotion of "academic freedom.
The use of a pure effects analysis would also have prevented the
Court from further confusing the use of motive inquiries in other
areas of constitutional law.80 The Court has now explicitly expanded purpose and motive inquiries to the point where it will feel
free to dispute a statute's articulation of purpose. Given the reality
that legislatures are likely to resort to "sham" statements of purpose more often in the future when enacting legislation of questionable constitutionality, it may have been necessary for the
Court to have taken this step at some point. However, given the
lack of development of motive inquiries in general, and especially
with motive inquiries in the area of establishment clause analyses,
this was probably the wrong time to extend this broad tool to an
undefined area when the Court could clearly have avoided having
to do so by either equating creationism with religion" or falling
76. But see, Brief for the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights, Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants. "The only issue for this court is whether this exercise of
Louisiana's responsibility to establish public school curricula violates the Establishment
Clause by failing to display a secular purpose." Id.
77. See, e.g., McLean, supra note 1. "Since creation science is not science, the conclusion is inescapable that the only real effect of [the statute then in question] is the advancement of religion." 529 F. Supp. at 1272. In McLean, after a full trial on the merits, the claim
brought against the model act which provided the basis for Louisiana's Act was determined
to violate the establishment clause under an effects analysis and other parts of the Lemon
test. Id. See also, Amicus Curiae Brief of 72 Nobel Laureates, 17 State Academies of Science, and 7 Other Scientific Organizations, in Support of Appellees (Argument for Appellees) ("The Term 'Creation-Science' in the Act Embodies Religious Dogma, Not the Sterilized 'Abrupt Appearance' Construct..."). Id. at 9.
78. This reasoning was relied on, in part, by the district court in its opinion. Aguillard
v. Treen, 634 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. La. 1985). "Because it promotes the belief of some theistic
sects to the detriment of others, the statute violates the fundamental First Amendment
principle that a state must be neutral in its treatment of religions." Id. at 429.
79. See supra note 19.
80. See supra note 75.
81. See supra note 77.
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back on the "inference" method on which it has relied in the
82
past.
Peter Santos

82.

See supra notes 51-70 and accompanying text.

